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“Sharing” Copyrights: The Copyright Implications of User 
Content in Social Media 
Jessica Gutierrez Alm* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is a place of open communication and idea 
sharing. This both coincides and conflicts with the policy rationales 
of copyright law. The primary function of copyright law is “to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by providing 
creators with economic incentive and security.1 The Internet 
promotes collaboration and free expression, and thus advances the 
goal of copyright law: creativity. However, the Internet has also 
introduced unique problems to copyright jurisprudence. The 
unprecedented instant transfer of information allows rapid and 
large-scale infringement. Coupled with the Internet’s sharing 
atmosphere, this has fostered a generation of users who freely 
disregard copyrights. Some of these issues were addressed under 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which left courts 
to sort through a somewhat awkward melding of old law and new 
technology. Now, fifteen years after enactment of the DMCA, the 
law is still unclear, and the need for new legislation is evident in the 
face of the Internet’s expanding applications.2 
                                                
* Juris Doctor expected, Hamline University School of Law, 2014. The author 
would like to thank her husband for his unwavering support; her family for their 
encouragement and guidance; and the editors of the Hamline Journal of Public 
Law and Policy for their assistance and for affording her this opportunity. 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
2 See Julie Nichols Matthews et al., Social Media in the Digital Millennium, 5 
LANDSLIDE 26, 26–27 (2013). 
When the DMCA was signed into law in 1998, social media was still nascent, as 
was much of the World Wide Web. As a result, the legislation could not and did 
not take into account the drastic shift in online culture that would occur in the 
following 15 years. Today, social medial users, copyright holders, Internet 
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One such application is online social media. In recent years, 
social media has ingrained itself in popular culture, bringing with it 
a multitude of copyright complications. Social media changed the 
face of the Internet, and quickly became one of the web’s most 
prevalent outlets.3 
As a requirement for using social media websites, users 
must agree to the websites’ Terms of Use (TOU), which govern the 
relationships between users and the sites. These website TOU often 
have similar terms that relate to and control the types of content that 
individuals may post. 
The content that users post can generally be divided into two 
categories: user-found content and user-generated content. The 
difference lies in where the information originates; a user’s own 
creative product is user-generated, but information that a user finds 
                                                
service providers, and courts continue to wrestle with the consequences of the 
system established in simpler times. 
Id. Congress has enacted some legislation since the DMCA, but it is aimed 
primarily at minor modifications. See, e.g., Copyright Cleanup Clarification and 
Correction Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-295, 124 Stat. 3180 (2010) (clarifying 
certain phrases within the Copyright Act); Satellite Television Extension and 
Localism Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-175, 124 Stat. 1218 (2010) (extending the 
length of statutory licenses for satellite carriers). Other enactments have focused 
on narrow piracy and enforcement issues. See, e.g., Family Entertainment and 
Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005) (addressing 
unauthorized video recording in movie theaters); Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 
Stat. 4256 (2008) (enhancing certain criminal and civil remedies, improving 
funding for enforcement, and creating the Intellectual Property Enforcement 
Coordinator position); see Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 319–20 (2013) (discussing the current need for new 
comprehensive copyright legislation). 
3 Ylan Q. Mui & Peter Whoriskey, Facebook Passes Google as Most Popular 
Site on the Internet, Two Measures Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2010, 12:00 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/12/30/AR2010123004645.html (stating that Facebook surpassed Google in 
Internet traffic); Sarah Kessler, Americans Spend 23% of Internet Time on Social 
Networks, MASHABLE (Sept. 12, 2011), http://mashable.com/ 
2011/09/12/23-percent-online (reporting that social media is the most frequent 
use of the Internet). 
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elsewhere on the Internet and reposts or forwards on to others is 
user-found.4 Early social media leaders like Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter originally focused on user-generated content by 
offering platforms where users could post images, videos, and 
writings they create. Much of this user-generated content may be 
copyrightable, but by simply posting it online, users transfer broad 
rights to social media companies through the sites’ TOU. This 
leaves users with little bargaining power and questionable 
ownership rights in their own content. 
A recent shift in social media platforms led to what some 
refer to as “second-generation” social media.5 The second-
generation platforms entered the market following the success of 
forerunners like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter.6 Second-
generation websites distinguish themselves by relying on the 
proliferation of user-found content, whereas the first generation 
relied primarily on user-generated content.7 Copyright problems 
may arise when a user posts found content that is actually someone 
else’s creative content. In the absence of clear legal standards, this 
has become a common and encouraged practice on the Internet. 
Historically, innovation has always challenged copyright 
law.8 Inevitably, the legal implications surrounding new 
                                                
4 See Craig C. Carpenter, Copyright Infringement and the Second Generation of 
Social Media: Why Pinterest Users Should be Protected from Copyright 




8 Technological innovations threaten copyright law by revolutionizing the ability 
to copy and distribute. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908) (assignee of copyrights on music compositions brought suit against 
player piano sellers); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 
U.S. 390 (1968) (owners of copyrights on motion pictures brought suit against 
television rebroadcasting company); Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (owners of copyrights on television programs brought suit against 
manufacturers of videotape recorders). See generally Vincent J. Roccia, What’s 
Fair is (Not Always) Fair on the Internet, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 155, 163–64 (1997) 
(discussing copyright law’s response to such technologies as the VCR, 
photocopier, and tape recorder); Sony, 464 U.S. at 430–31 (“From its beginning, 
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technologies are at first unclear, and potentially infringing conduct 
becomes commonplace before courts or legislatures have the 
opportunity to address it. This can be seen through the recent 
example of online file sharing in the early 2000s.9 Illegal Internet 
file sharing became popular among millions of users before 
copyright holders brought massive waves of lawsuits against 
individual users and software providers.10 Similarly, sharing and 
linking to copyrighted user-found content has become an accepted 
Internet practice, with unclear copyright implications among users. 
One recent platform that saw rapid success after its launch, 
Pinterest, relies almost exclusively on user-found content.11 As 
copyright law struggles to catch up to these new challenges, users 
are left only with the guidance of convoluted website TOU. 
This article examines the copyright implications of both 
user-generated and user-found content posted to social media 
websites, and how the websites’ TOU affect copyrights in user 
content. Part II looks first to the copyrightability of user-generated 
content, and then to the broad copyright license that social media 
TOU impose on users. Part III discusses the rising culture of user-
found content, the apparent conflict with website TOU, and the 
infringement issues that may arise with linking to others’ content, 
including possible defenses. 
II. USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
User-generated content consists of the text, images, and 
videos that social media users independently create and post 
online.12 Much of this product is likely copyrightable. 
                                                
the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of . . . the printing press that gave rise to 
the original need for copyright protection.” (citations omitted)). 
9 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
10 Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 
2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 34–35 (2006). 
11 See infra Section III.C. 
12 Carpenter, supra note 4, at 10. 
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A. Copyrightability 
The 1976 Copyright Act (“Copyright Act”) defines 
copyrightable material as “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”13 Section 102 further defines 
“works of authorship” to include a list of eight categories, though 
the list is non-exhaustive.14 To determine copyrightability, courts 
look to whether a work is both (1) “original” and (2) “fixed,” rather 
than focusing on whether it falls within one of the enumerated 
categories of Section 102.15 
In defining the first element, originality, the Supreme Court 
stated the work must be an “independent creation” that exhibits a 
“modicum of creativity.”16 At least some user-generated content 
may pass the test of originality. User-generated content, as long as 
it is created by the individual user, fits the first requirement of 
“independent creation.”17 A user’s status updates, comments, and 
self-made videos and photos are all independent creations when 
generated by the individual user. However, much of the content on 
social media websites will not easily satisfy the modicum of 
creativity component. 
                                                
13 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
14 Id. This list includes: 
literary works; 
musical works, including any accompanying works; 
dramatic works, including any accompanying music; 
pantomimes and choreographic works; 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; 
sound recordings; and 
architectural works. 
15 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 
1997) (“[T]he designation ‘works of authorship’ is not meant to be limited to 
traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays. Rather, Congress used 
this phrase to extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve.”). 
16 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
17 See Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 806 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (defining “originality” to mean only that “the work is 
independently created rather than copied from other works” (citations omitted)). 
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In addition to being independently created, content must 
have a “modicum of creativity” to be deemed original. Although the 
threshold for creativity is low, much of the content users post may 
not contain the requisite creativity. The Supreme Court specifically 
stated that not all photographs hold the creativity to be 
copyrightable.18 However, the court indicated that photographs 
would likely only need a small degree of composure and 
positioning to receive copyright protection.19 The same principles 
apply to user-created videos, but status updates and comments are 
less likely to receive protection. 
The lengths for status updates and comments are sometimes 
limited and the majority consists only of short sentences of 
conversational words, from which creativity would be hard to find. 
Slogans, short phrases, and expressions of common words are 
generally not copyrightable because they do not show the necessary 
modicum of creativity.20 Although, this does not mean that a written 
work has to fit a certain length before courts will find creativity. 
Poems, for example, qualify for copyright protection due to 
                                                
18 Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
19 Id. at 61. In holding that a photograph of Oscar Wilde was copyrightable, the 
court noted the photographer’s creativity seen through positioning the subject, 
arrangement of “costume, draperies, and other various accessories,” and 
“arranging and disposing the light and shade.” Id. at 60. The court stated that not 
all photographs may be copyrightable, because many may simply be “the mere 
mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines of some object 
animate or inanimate, and involve[] no originality of thought or any novelty in 
the intellectual operation connected with its visible reproduction in shape of a 
picture.” Id. at 58–59. See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding that the photographer’s “inventive efforts” in posing subjects of 
the photograph met the requisite element of creativity); Mannion v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that the 
photographer’s unusual angle, distinctive lighting, composition, and wardrobe 
instructions evidenced originality, rendering a photograph of a young man 
wearing a white t-shirt and a large amount of jewelry copyrightable). 
20 Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 
1959). See also Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., No. 00-4022, 2002 WL 287786, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002) (holding that the lyrical phrase “clap your hands” is not 
copyrightable because it is a common phrase). 
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creativity in the arrangement of the words.21 There are great works, 
of which copyright protection is unquestioned, that would fit 
comfortably within Twitter’s 140-character limit.22 Accordingly, 
some status updates and comments will surely meet the creativity 
threshold of originality. 
In addition to the element of originality, works must also be 
fixed in a tangible form in order to receive copyright protection. 
The Copyright Act defines “fixed” as an expression in which a 
work may be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.”23 The analysis of 
whether a work is sufficiently fixed for more than a transitory 
period is a fact-specific one,24 but some technological cases shed 
light on what courts may deem “fixed.”25 In Cartoon Network, a 
court held that Internet data that existed for only 1.2 seconds before 
it was automatically rewritten was transitory and not fixed.26 In 
MAI Systems, however, a court held that RAM, a computer’s 
temporary memory that is erased upon shut down, is fixed in a 
tangible form.27 In general, the content posted on social media 
websites is not automatically deleted or overwritten. It remains 
                                                
21 See Rebecca Haas, Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the Internet 
Age, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 243 (2010) (citing Becker v. 
Loew’s, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943)). However, protection in the 
poem as a whole does not afford copyright protection to the individual words. 
Becker, 133 F.2d at 891. 
22 See generally George Wei, Certainty of Subject-Matter in the Development of 
Intellectual Property: “Please Sir, I Want Some More!” 2009 SING. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 474, 502 n.58 (2009) (stating “[n]o doubt Haiku poems can be protected as 
original literary works applying basic copyright principles.”). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
24 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 130 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
25 See, e.g., id.; MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th 
Cir. 1993). 
26 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130. 
27 Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 
356, 362–63 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“Although the contents of RAM are, in some 
respects, ephemeral or transient, it is important to remember that the Act does not 
require absolute permanence.”). 
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stored, visible, and searchable. User-generated content is unlike the 
transitory information in Cartoon Network, and is even more 
permanent than the RAM memory in MAI Systems. A court would 
likely find social media content to be fixed in tangible form. 
Therefore, for those works that also meet the originality 
requirement, this renders at least some user-generated content 
copyrightable material. 
When an original work of authorship is fixed in a tangible 
form, the author is granted six exclusive rights of ownership. These 
include the rights to: reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute 
copies, perform audiovisual works publicly, perform sound 
recordings publicly, and display publicly.28 For those user-
generated works that are copyrightable, the act of fixation grants 
copyright protection for all six rights to the owner.29 However, 
when the act of fixation occurs on a social media outlet, broad 
website TOU may automatically alter the author’s rights. 
B. Terms of Use and Licensing User Rights 
Social media platforms function by distributing user content 
to other users. In order not to infringe users’ copyrights, social 
media website TOU require the users to license the rights to their 
content. Agreement to the TOU is usually accomplished when the 
user clicks “agree” at the bottom of a page of dense text. This type 
of online contract formation, known as a “click-wrap” agreement,30 
                                                
28 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
29 The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 did away with the 
formalities that authors had to comply with under earlier acts in order to receive 
copyright protection. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100–568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). Formalities required for copyright protection 
under prior laws included publication of the work, notice of copyright date and 
ownership, registration with the Copyright Office, and deposit of copies with the 
Library of Congress. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with 
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 311 (2010). 
30 A click-wrap agreement is defined as: 
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is usually upheld, because the act of clicking “agree” notifies the 
user of the terms and requires assent.31 The TOU of Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Pinterest each state that the user 
retains the rights to any user-generated content.32 However, each 
platform then requires the user to agree to an extremely broad non-
exclusive license. Facebook, for example, states that the user grants 
a “non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, 
worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in 
connection with Facebook.”33 YouTube, Pinterest, and Twitter go 
further and state that the license permits the company specific 
rights.34 YouTube’s license, for example, permits it to “reproduce, 
distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform” user 
                                                
[An] agreement [that] appears when a user first installs computer software 
obtained from an online source or attempts to conduct an Internet transaction 
involving the agreement, and purports to condition further access to the software 
or transaction on the user's consent to certain conditions there specified; the user 
“consents” to these conditions by “clicking” on a dialog box on the screen, which 
then proceeds with the remainder of the software installation or Internet 
transaction. 
Kevin W. Grierson, Enforceability of “Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements 
Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 
A.L.R.5th 309, 317 n.1 (2003). 
31 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use 
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 547 (2003); Nathan J. Davis, Presumed 
Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 
(2007). 
32 See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www. 
facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You own all of the 
content and information you post on Facebook.”); YouTube, Terms of Service, 
http://www.YouTube.com/t/terms (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain all of 
your ownership rights in your Content.”); Pinterest, Terms of Service, 
http://about.pinterest.com/terms/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain all 
rights in . . . the User Content you post.”); Twitter, Terms of Service, 
https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“You retain your rights to any 
Content you submit, post or display.”); Instagram, Terms of Use, 
http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (“Instagram 
does not claim ownership of any Content that you post.”). 
33 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32. 
34 YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32; Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra 
note 32; Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32. 
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content.35 This carefully drafted language licenses to Youtube all 
six of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights granted by the 
Copyright Act, along with the right to sub-license all six rights.36 
These licenses are non-exclusive, and therefore do not transfer 
ownership.37 However, the licenses are so broad that they permit the 
websites to do nearly anything with user-generated content, 
questioning what rights the user has in the face of such licenses. 
Although some sites such as Pinterest detail specific uses for 
user content in their TOU,38 other sites like Instagram have only 
vague language such as a “license to use the Content that you 
post.”39 This ambiguous language does not state how users’ content 
will be exploited. Facebook’s terms present similar vagueness: a 
“license to use any IP content that you post.”40 Facebook’s TOU do 
not define “use,” leaving an ill-defined license of unknown limits. 
As one commentator noted, Facebook could “surreptitiously 
sublicense user content to porno.com” and “this would fall squarely 
                                                
35 YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32. Pinterest and Twitter, however, 
license themselves rights that are not defined under copyright law, but are 
specific to the services. See Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing 
the rights to “process, adapt, modify . . . [and] transmit” user content); Pinterest, 
Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing the right to “re-pin” user content). It is 
difficult to determine where these rights fit within copyright law. For example, in 
Pinterest, the right to “re-pin” would seem to simply include the collective rights 
to copy and distribute, rights that are also included in Pinterest’s terms, creating a 
duplicative effect. In Twitter’s TOU, the right to “process” is even more difficult 
to square with the Copyright Act’s six exclusive rights. This seems somewhat of 
an illusory right. 
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting to copyright owners the rights to 
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform (audiovisual works) 
publicly, perform (sound recordings) publicly, and display publicly). YouTube’s 
language parallels the statutory grant of rights. 
37 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” to 
include exclusive licenses, but not nonexclusive licenses). 
38 Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (licensing user content to Pinterest 
“solely for the purposes of operating, developing, providing, and using the 
Pinterest Products”). 
39 Instagram, Terms of Use, supra note 32. 
40 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32) (emphasis 
added). 
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within the license Facebook purports to be granted by users.”41 The 
majority of users would likely be surprised to learn that they have 
licensed such broad latitude with their user-generated content. 
However, the licenses are often so vaguely defined that they may 
actually be unenforceable. 
For example, in Cohen, plaintiffs alleged that Facebook 
misappropriated their names and likenesses for commercial 
purposes.42 The court found that, while users may have consented to 
Facebook’s use of their names and pictures, the TOU did not 
establish consent for Facebook to disclose what online services they 
had utilized or to endorse those services with the names and 
pictures.43 The court went on to discuss that Facebook’s TOU did 
not provide a blanket license to exploit user content for any 
purpose: “Presumably, Facebook would not argue that its supposed 
license to use profile pictures ‘in any manner’ would insulate it 
from defamation claims were it to post the names and pictures of 
the named plaintiffs on every user’s Facebook home page, over a 
caption reading, ‘the FBI’s Most Wanted.’”44 
Facebook’s and other sites’ TOU may also be challengeable 
because, although the licenses purport to terminate when the user 
deletes her account, many of the licenses also incorporate an 
inconsistent grant of continued use. Facebook’s terms, for example, 
state “this IP License ends when you delete your IP content on your 
account unless your content has been shared with others, and they 
have not deleted it.”45 Although Facebook expressly states that its 
license ends when a user terminates his account, the second half of 
                                                
41 Steven Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part 
Two—Agreements Between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 848 (2008). 
42 Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092 (N.D. Cal 2011). 
43 Id. at 1095–96. 
44 Id. at 1096; see also Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 805–06 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that it was a question of fact whether plaintiffs-
Facebook users consented to have their names and likenesses used in Facebook’s 
“sponsored story” advertisements). 
45 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (emphasis 
added). 
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the same sentence is contradictory. The attraction of Facebook (and 
other social media sites) is in “sharing” content with other users.46 
Thus, although Facebook claims to end its license, the fact that 
hundreds or thousands of shared copies may persist within 
Facebook’s site suggests that the license does not ever terminate. 
This inconsistency questions the nature of Facebook’s non-
exclusive license and may render the license difficult to interpret 
and enforce. 
While not all user-generated content is copyrightable, much 
of it may be, and that content is subject to automatic, extensive 
licenses as soon as it is posted. While these terms may not impact 
many users, they could have major implications for artists or 
authors who post their works on their social media profiles. 
According to the TOU, there is nothing stopping social media 
companies from selling copies of a user-photographer’s photos, for 
example, or placing them in advertisements. While the TOU may be 
unenforceable in some aspects for vagueness or broadness, they do 
aver to follow the Copyright Act, and leave the user with little 
bargaining power or remedies for her rights. Thus, social media 
licenses for user-generated content exemplify the problematic 
juxtaposition of technology with existing copyright law, 
demonstrating the need for new legislation. 
III. USER-FOUND CONTENT 
An array of copyright issues also arises with user-found 
content on social media. The second-generation of social media 
platforms includes both a shift among first-generation platforms, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as a series of start-up sites 
that rely almost exclusively on user-found content. Through 
policies and operations, second-generation social media sites 
encourage users to post content that is not their own. Users are 
encouraged to post content created by other users or from different 
                                                
46 See infra Part III. 
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websites altogether: a practice often referred to as “linking”.47 
Facebook permits this linking activity through “sharing” of user 
posts or outside content, Twitter accomplishes it through allowing 
“retweets” of user posts, and Pinterest allows users to “pin” content 
from other websites.48 However, the social media sites’ actions of 
encouraging such content squarely contradict their TOU.49 
A. Infringement through Linking 
There are two possible avenues of infringement by user-
found content: (1) sharing someone else’s original content, and (2) 
sharing content that is already infringing. A user may first be 
directly liable for infringing the exclusive rights of reproduction, 
distribution, and display or performance when sharing content 
created by others. For example, retweeting a copyrightable tweet, a 
poem perhaps, may leave the retweeter open to liability. The 
retweet copies the original by reposting the poem (in the same 
tangible form as the original), consequently violating the 
reproduction right.50 Infringement of the right of reproduction 
requires a showing of two elements: copying and 
misappropriation.51 Misappropriation is present when copying goes 
so far as to constitute improper appropriation, and is easily met 
when the entire work is copied.52 In the case of retweeting, both 
                                                
47 See generally Jean G. Vidal Font, Sharing Media on Social Networks: 
Infringement by Linking?, 3 NO. 2 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 255 (2012) (discussing third-
party liability attributable to users who link to others’ content). “This [user-
found] content includes, but is not limited to, Internet links, videos, web pages, 
photos, and any other content that a user can find on the Internet.” Id. at 256. 
48 Facebook, Links: Sharing Links, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/335697046510763/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013); Twitter, FAQs About 
Retweets, https://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/109-tweets-
messages/articles/77606-what-is-retweet-rt# (last visited Nov. 27, 2013); 
Pinterest, Pinterest Basics, http://about.pinterest.com/basics/ (last visited Nov. 27, 
2013). 
49 See Carpenter, supra note 4, at 10. 
50 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012). 
51 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
52 See id. 
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elements are present because other users can see that the retweeter 
plainly copied the entire original from its source. The public 
distribution and public display rights are likely also violated as the 
retweeter has now made the poem available to all of the user’s 
online friends without authorization.53 Violation of the display and 
distribution rights requires a public audience, which the Copyright 
Act defines as “a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of a family and its social acquaintances.”54 With the average 
number of Twitter “followers” (i.e. friends who can see posts) at 
208, the public audience standard is likely met.55 
Similarly, users may also share others’ copyrighted content 
from outside websites. If a user posts a link to an online news story, 
for example, a thumbnail-sized photo from the story is displayed, 
along with hidden Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) 
instructions that link to the original story. When the user clicks on 
the link, the HTML instructions direct the user to the original 
source of the image. This process of displaying a thumbnail image 
from another website and using HTML instructions directing users 
                                                
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)–(6) (2012). 
54 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
To perform or display a work “publicly” means—  
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances is gathered; or 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or 
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance 
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times. 
Id. (emphasis added). This definition encompasses public display and 
performances via computer. 
55 An Exhaustive Study of Twitter Users Across the World, BEEVOLVE (Oct. 10, 
2012), http://www.beevolve.com/ 
twitter-statistics. See also Lars Backstrom, Anatomy of Facebook, FACEBOOK 
(Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-team/anatomy-
of-facebook/10150388519243859 (finding that the average number of Facebook 
friends is 190); Sudip Mittal et al., The Pin-Bang Theory: Discovering the 
Pinterest World, (July 18, 2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1307.4952v1.pdf (finding 
that the average number of Pinterest followers is 176). 
118 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 35:1 
to the original is known as “in-line linking.”56 Like the tweeted 
poem, the photo from the news story is likely copyrightable. The 
thumbnail photo shared by the user, a copy from the original 
website, may directly infringe reproduction, distribution, and 
display rights, as does the retweeted poem. These actions at least 
create a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement. 
The second type of infringement that may occur with user-
found content is via third-party liability, which may arise when a 
user links to content that already constitutes an infringement. For 
example, if a Facebook user shares an in-line link to a music video 
on YouTube to which the original YouTube poster did not have the 
rights, the Facebook user may be contributorily liable. Contributory 
liability arises when an individual who has knowledge of infringing 
activity “induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another.”57 As an initial requirement, there must be an 
underlying direct infringement by another party before contributory 
liability can attach.58 When the user’s friends download or even 
view the unauthorized music video, they may be directly infringing 
a copyright holder’s rights.59 The Facebook user may then be 
contributorily liable if she has knowledge that the video is 
infringing, because her act of making it available to her friends 
arguably “induces, causes or materially contributes” to their 
infringing activity.60 
After the Supreme Court’s contributory liability analyses in 
Sony and Grokster,61 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 
10,62 there are still questions as to the level of knowledge required 
                                                
56 IP Due Diligence in Corp. Transactions § 8:83 (2013); see Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2007). 
57 Perfect 10, 508 F.2d at 1171 (quoting Gershwin Publ’n Corp. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
58 A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013. 
59 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1171. 
60 See id. (citations omitted). 
61 See Sony, 464 U.S. 417; Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. 
62 In 2007, the Ninth Circuit actually decided a trilogy of related cases brought 
by Perfect 10. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’s Serv. 
Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., 488 F.3d 
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to prove contributory liability, and as to what may constitute 
inducement, causation, or material contributions in technology 
cases.63 However, if the video or other infringing content is 
something that the user should know is not a legal online post—it 
was from an unofficial source, for example—the knowledge 
requirement is likely met.64 Additionally, the Facebook user’s act of 
sharing the video with her friends may be considered “inducing” 
infringing activity if her friends further infringe copyrights on the 
video. Therefore, not only might the Facebook sharer in this 
scenario be directly liable for violating reproduction, distribution, 
and performance rights, she would also likely be contributorily 
liable for any infringing activity that arises out sharing the video. 
Two federal appellate courts recently considered issues of 
infringement liability with respect to linking to online content.65 In 
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit reviewed Perfect 10’s 
request for a preliminary injunction against Google based on its 
claim that Google infringed Perfect 10’s copyrights to certain 
                                                
1102 (9th Cir. 2007). All three touched on the issue of contributory liability. In 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the court considered Perfect 10’s attempt to 
hold Google liable for direct and indirect infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrights 
through use of Google’s image search function. 508 F.3d at 1154. The Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n case involved Perfect 10’s attempt to impose 
vicarious and contributory liability on financial institutions for processing credit 
card payments on websites that sold unauthorized copies of Perfect 10’s images. 
494 F.3d at 792. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C., the court reviewed Perfect 
10’s attempt to hold companies liable for providing web hosting and other 
services to allegedly infringing websites. 488 F.3d at 1108. See generally Robert 
A. McFarlane, The Ninth Circuit Lands a “Perfect 10” Applying Copyright Law 
to the Internet, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rev. 381 (2008). 
63 See David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liability for Contributory 
Copyright Infringement, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH F. 110701 (2006) 
(discussing the varying approaches to contributory liability taken by courts in 
recent technology cases). 
64 Additionally, some courts have held that constructive knowledge is enough to 
satisfy this element. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n 
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
65 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d 1146; Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
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images.66 The case involved Google’s image search function, which 
displays thumbnail images, along with HTML instructions directing 
users to the original image, in response to a user’s search queries.67 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the thumbnail images separately from 
the HTML in-line link.68 The court held that the thumbnail images 
that Google displayed in response to a user’s search queries were 
likely direct infringements of Perfect 10’s display right.69 However, 
the court also held that Google likely had an adequate fair use 
defense to its direct infringement of the copyrighted images.70 
Regarding in-line linking, the court held that the process of 
in-line linking to an original image through HTML instructions was 
not direct infringement.71 The court reasoned that the in-line links 
were not copies of the original images “fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression,” because they only consisted of HTML instructions 
that directed the user to the original image.72 Without a fixed copy, 
there could be no infringement. Although Google’s in-line linking 
did not directly violate Perfect 10’s copyrights, the court held that 
the process may create contributory liability where the links 
directed users to already infringing copies on third-party sites.73 The 
process of in-line linking was directing more user traffic to the 
                                                
66 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1154. 
67 Id. at 1155. 
68 See id. at 1159–62. 
69 Id. at 1160. 
70 Id. at 1168; see infra Part III.D. 
71 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160–61. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1172–73 (“Google could be held contributorily liable if it had 
knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search 
engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s 
copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”); see also Batesville Servs., 
Inc. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-01011-DFH-TA, 2004 WL 2750253 
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 10, 2004) (holding that an issue of fact existed regarding 
defendant’s potential direct or contributory liability for creating links to 
unauthorized photographs of plaintiff’s products and reproducing thumbnails of 
the photographs). 
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infringing material, which could be inducing, causing or materially 
contributing to direct infringements.74 
Similarly, in Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, the Seventh 
Circuit considered whether a website that allows users to post links 
to infringing material incurs contributory liability.75 In that case, a 
video production company, Flava Works, sued a video 
bookmarking website, myVidster, which allowed users to post links 
to outside videos.76 Flava argued that the bookmarking website was 
contributorily liable for providing links by which viewers could 
access infringing copies of Flava’s videos.77 In contrast to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, the Seventh Circuit Court held that the links to 
infringing copies of Flava’s videos did not create contributory 
liability.78 
The myVidster site was not contributorily liable for 
infringing the right of reproduction because the conduct that 
myVidster induced—watching copyrighted material without paying 
for it—was not infringing.79 With no underlying infringement, there 
could be no contributory liability. After struggling to define the 
meaning of “performance” in the Internet context, the court held 
that myVidster also did not incur contributory liability for violation 
of the performance right.80 Although viewers who clicked on the 
link may have violated the performance right, the court held that 
myVidster was not significantly contributing to the infringing 
activity.81 
                                                
74 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172. 
75 Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 757. 
76 Id. at 756. 
77 Id. at 757–58. 
78 Id. at 762. 
79 Id. at 757–58 (holding that viewing Flava’s videos for free through the 
myVidster site, and thus avoiding Flava’s fees, is the equivalent of “stealing a 
copyrighted book from the bookstore and reading it” or “sn[eaking] into a 
moving theater and watch[ing] a copyrighted movie without buying a ticket. The 
facilitator of conduct that doesn’t infringe copyright is not a contributory 
infringer.”). 
80 Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 760–62. 
81 Id. But see Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 
WL 79311 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (holding that creating links to a stream of a 
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Perfect 10 and Flava Works exemplify courts’ difficulty 
with applying existing copyright laws to Internet practices.82 The 
two outcomes are not easily reconciled, and the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis in Flava Works has been criticized for straying too far from 
the Copyright Act.83 In spite of, or perhaps due to, the uncertain 
application of the copyright laws to these issues, linking to 
copyrighted material on social media platforms persists. 
B. Terms of Use Regarding Infringement 
While social media practices and policies encourage sharing 
and linking with user-found content, the TOU simultaneously 
discourage it in a likely attempt to protect the websites from 
liability. First, social media TOU require users to own the rights to 
all posted content.84 Additionally, the TOU contain language either 
                                                
live webcast of motor races shown in real time was infringing on the plaintiff’s 
public performance right). 
82 In wrestling with application of the performance right, the Seventh Circuit 
even requested legislative guidance in its opinion: “Legislative clarification of the 
public-performance provision of the Copyright Act would therefore be most 
welcome.” Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 761. 
83 See Copyright Law - Contributory Infringement - Seventh Circuit Holds That -
Social Bookmarking- of Infringing Content Alone Is Insufficient to Support Grant 
of Preliminary Injunction. - Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 2479 (2013). 
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning deviated from the text of the Copyright Act and 
focused largely on the motives of allegedly contributory infringers. . . . Even if 
one concedes that intent is relevant to the question of contributory infringement, 
the Seventh Circuit’s inquiry in Flava remains unconvincing because it neglected 
to account adequately for technical advances that have upended the behavior, and 
thus the motives, or both providers and consumers of copyrighted content. 
Id. at 2485. 
84 See Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (“You 
own all of the content and information you post on Facebook.”); YouTube, 
Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“You affirm, represent, and warrant that you 
own or have the necessary licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to publish 
Content you submit.”); Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“You represent 
and warrant that you have all the rights, power and authority necessary to grant 
the rights granted herein to any Content that you submit.”); Instagram, Terms of 
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requiring users not to infringe others’ copyrights, or at least stating 
that accounts may be terminated if users infringe copyrights. For 
example, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram each require users to 
agree that they will not post infringing material.85 Conversely, 
Twitter’s TOU state that “[the company] respects the intellectual 
property rights of others and expects [users] to do the same,” 
without any express language requiring users not to infringe 
copyrights.86 While this statement does not appear to be more than a 
mere suggestion, the site also states that infringing material may be 
removed and users’ access may be terminated after repeat 
infringements.87 By openly inviting users to disregard copyrights 
through the use of linking, while requiring users to agree to TOU 
that disallow and condemn the practice, social media websites are 
squarely placing liability with the unknowing users. 
                                                
Use, supra note 32 (“You represent and warrant that: (i) you own the Content 
posted by you on or through the Service or otherwise have the right to grant the 
rights and licenses set forth in these Terms of Use.”). Until June 2012, Pinterest 
had similar language in its TOU. See Kirsten Kowalski, Why I Tearfully Deleted 
My Pinterest Inspiration Boards, DDK PORTRAITS BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://ddkportraits.com/v2/2012/02/why-i-tearfully-deleted-my-pinterest-
inspiration-boards/ (quoting Pinterest’s earlier TOU as including the phrase “you 
either are the sole and exclusive owner of all Member Content that you make 
available through the Site, Application and Services, or you have all rights, 
license, consents and releases that are necessary.”). 
85 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 (“You will 
not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates 
someone else’s rights.”); YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (“Content 
you submit to the Service will not contain third party copyrighted material, or 
material that is subject to other third party proprietary rights, unless you have 
permission.”); Instagram, Terms of Use, supra note 32 (“the posting and use of 
your Content on or through the Service does not violate, misappropriate or 
infringe on the rights of any third party, including . . . copyrights, trademark, 
and/or other intellectual property rights.”). 
86 Twitter, Terms of Service, supra note 32. 
87 Id. 
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C. The Pinterest Problem 
The issues of infringement by linking to user-found content 
are particularly troublesome with respect to second-generation 
social media platforms like Pinterest. Pinterest, launched in 2010 
and already boasting 48.7 million users, relies almost exclusively 
on user-found content.88 The site allows users to create multiple 
pages (“boards”) on which they can “pin” links to material on 
outside websites.89 After registering with Pinterest, the user can 
install a “pin it” button to the web browser toolbar, allowing the 
user to pin virtually any online content.90 Each pin appears on the 
user’s board as a thumbnail image, taken from the outside website. 
Other Pinterest users can see the pinned images and click on them 
to be directed to the outside websites via an in-line link.91 Pinterest 
pins create the same issues of direct and contributory liability seen 
with retweeting, Facebook sharing, and other methods of linking 
material, primarily due to the copied thumbnail images and in-line 
linking. However, the level of infringement associated with 
Pinterest is greater because the site relies almost exclusively on 
users’ willingness for, or ignorance of, infringement. Until April 
2012, Pinterest expressly discouraged users from posting their own 
content, suggesting that only outside material should be pinned.92 
While Pinterest users may now more freely pin user-generated 
content, the site still relies primarily on user-found content, and 
therefore is likely filled with unauthorized copies of and links to 
copyrighted content. 
As with other sites that allow user-found content, Pinterest’s 
TOU are inconsistent on this point. Pinterest’s TOU reserve the 
                                                
88 Sarah McBride, Start-up Pinterest Wins New Funding, $2.5 Billion Valuation, 
REUTERS (Feb 20, 2013, 8:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/21/ 
net-us-funding-pinterest-idUSBRE91K01R20130221. 
89 Pinterest, Pinterest Basics, supra note 48. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Kirsten M. Koepsel, Social Networks and the Uneasy Relationship with 
Copyright Law, 45 MD. B.J. 20, 29–30 (2012) (discussing Pinterest’s previous 
TOU and “Pin Etiquette” policy). 
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right to remove infringing content, and in a separate “Acceptable 
Use” policy, the site requires users to agree not to pin content they 
do not have the right to post.93 After a lawyer blogged about the 
inconsistencies in Pinterest’s TOU regarding infringement, 
Pinterest received backlash from users, prompting the site to initiate 
an “opt-out” policy whereby other websites can prevent material on 
their websites from being pinned.94 Of course this is inconsistent 
with the existing copyright regime; copyright licenses are not 
automatic contracts that require opting out.95 Though this displays 
an attempt on Pinterest’s part to acknowledge copyright owners’ 
rights, the site still relies on copyright infringement as a basic 
premise, apparently placing all liability on users.96 
D. Defenses 
Social media websites’ conflicting TOU and policies 
regarding infringement by linking leave users open to substantial 
liability, both for direct and third-party infringement. The websites 
invite and encourage infringing activity from their users, leaving 
users to believe that their actions are legal, or at the very least 
shielded by the websites. The sites claim protection for themselves 
through indemnity terms and under the safe harbor provision of the 
DMCA.97 The DMCA’s safe harbor provision protects “innocent” 
                                                
93 Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32; Pinterest, Acceptable Use Policy, 
http://about.pinterest.com/use// (last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
94 Tia Fisher, Pinterest – Are The New Terms Better? The Legal View, SOCIAL 
MEDIA TODAY (March 29, 2012), http://socialmediatoday.com/emoderation/ 
480219/pinterest-are-new-terms-better-legal-view. See Kowalski, supra note 84. 
95 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204 (2012). 
96 See generally Julie Nichols Matthews et al., supra note 2, at 29 (discussing the 
copyright infringement issues associated with Pinterest). 
97 See, e.g., Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 32 
(indemnify); Facebook, About Intellectual Property, https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/www/399224883474207 (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice); 
Pinterest, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (indemnify); Pinterest, Copyright, 
http://about.pinterest.com/copyright/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice); 
YouTube, Terms of Service, supra note 32 (indemnify); YouTube, Copyright 
Infringement Notification Basics, http://www.youtube.com/yt/copyright/ 
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Internet service providers who do not have actual or constructive 
knowledge of infringing activities.98 To receive protection and 
remain innocent, the service providers must implement a policy for 
receiving and complying with complaints of infringement 
(“takedown notices”) from copyright holders.99 To comply with a 
takedown notice, websites must “remove or disable access to” the 
infringing material.100 This protects the sites from the contributory 
or vicarious liability they would most likely face due to the constant 
infringing activities happening through users’ linking and 
sharing.101 Without the DMCA safe harbor provision, Pinterest 
would be especially at risk because the entire site may not be 
“capable of substantial non-infringing uses.”102 With the safe harbor 
provision protecting social media platforms, a copyright holder’s 
only redress after his content is shared across the Internet is to sue 
the individual users who did the sharing. 
There may be some defenses available to social media users 
who link to copyrighted material. The Flava Works opinion 
suggests that social media users who link to infringing content may 
escape contributory liability, because linking is not a significant 
contribution to the infringing activity and because other users’ act 
of viewing infringing material may not be a direct infringement 
itself.103 Additionally, the Perfect 10 case suggests that where the 
link consists only of HTML instructions and does not include a 
thumbnail image or other copied representation, the user may be 
free from direct liability.104 Although the analyses in these cases 
                                                
copyright-complaint.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013) (DMCA notice). 
98 ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys. Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1) (2012)); see 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2012) (defining a 
“service provider” to include a broad range of Internet companies). 
99 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 625; 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
100 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
101 See A&M Records, 239 F.3d 1004. 
102 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
103 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding 
regarding contributory liability). 
104 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s 
treatment of in-line linking). 
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were factually driven and the law remains unsettled, these cases 
may offer defense arguments for social media users who link to 
third-party content. 
Additionally, the fair use defense may be a possible 
argument for social media users who infringe through user-found 
content; however the success of the argument is by no means 
certain. Fair use is an affirmative defense to infringement that 
“permits the use of copyrighted works without the copyright 
owner’s consent under certain situations.”105 In Perfect 10, the 
Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction against Google for 
its use of unauthorized thumbnail images, finding that fair use may 
be an adequate defense to direct liability.106 Fair use, as set forth in 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, requires consideration of four 
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the defendant’s use; (2) the 
nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the original that was used; and (4) the effect of the 
defendant’s use upon the plaintiff’s market.107 These factors are not 
exclusive, and courts will weigh them together “in light of the 
purposes of copyright.”108 
The first and fourth factors likely weigh in users’ favor. 
When the purpose for using the copyrighted content is not 
commercial and where the use is somehow transformative from the 
copyright holder’s original use, a fair use argument is strong.109 The 
purpose for linking on social media is usually non-commercial and 
is transformative, in that the purpose of sharing interesting content 
is different than the copyright holder’s purpose for creating and 
                                                
105 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1163. 
106 Id. at 1168. 
107 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
108 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
109 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449 (stating that a finding of non-commercial use 
creates a presumption in favor of fair use); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811, 819 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a search engine’s use of copyrighted 
photographs was transformative because the search engine used the photographs 
to “improve access to images on the internet”). 
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placing it online.110 Additionally, because the use is transformative, 
the act of sharing links to copyrighted content likely will not have a 
negative effect on the copyright holder’s market.111 If the original 
copyright holder’s purpose is to make a profit, the social media 
links may actually have a positive effect on the owner’s purpose by 
directing additional traffic to the original site. 
Conversely, the second and third factors seem to weigh 
against a finding of fair use. When the copyrighted work is artistic 
in nature, the second factor weighs against fair use.112 The majority 
of the works linked to on social media sites, such as photographs 
and videos, are likely artistic in nature.113 Finally, fair use is less 
likely found where the alleged infringer copies the entire work as a 
whole.114 Social media sharing generally requires use of the entire 
copyrighted work.115 
The four factors are not often weighed equally, making 
predictions difficult, but with two factors for and against a finding 
of fair use in this case, it would be a risky defense. Clearly, there is 
no certain defense that would apply to infringement by user-found 
content on social media sites, which further illustrates the need for 
new legislation. 
                                                
110 Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167 (holding that the transformative nature of 
Google’s thumbnail images made the first factor weigh in Google’s favor, despite 
any minor commercial aspect). 
111 Cf. id. at 1168 (holding that Google’s thumbnail-sized images did not hurt 
Perfect 10’s market for full-sized images). 
112 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (recognizing that where the copyrighted work 
is most creative, fair use is less likely because those works are “closer to the core 
of intended copyright protection than others”). 
113 Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167 (holding that although Perfect 10’s images 
were artistic in nature, the fact that they were “previously published” left the 
second factor weigh only slightly in Perfect 10’s favor). 
114 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use” (quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). 
115 Cf. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1167–68 (holding that although Google copied 
Perfect 10’s images in their entirety, complete copying was necessary due to the 
nature of a visual image search engine). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Copyright law in America, in its current stage of 
development, does not sit well with widespread social media 
practices. Users’ authored works are instantly subject to broad 
licenses, leaving users without any bargaining power over how their 
works are used. Moreover, the second-generation of social media 
that incorporates user-found content both encourages and prohibits 
copyright infringement. Despite the unfair licenses and rampant 
infringement, however, courts have not seen many lawsuits over 
copyrights in social media content. This is likely because copyright 
owners either enjoy the exposure to their works that social media 
provides, or because those who dislike it submit DMCA takedown 
notices with which sites quickly comply in order to remain within 
the safe harbor provision. With the social media platforms likely 
protected under the DMCA safe harbor, liability falls on the social 
media users, which leaves copyright owners with the unprofitable 
option to sue individual users.116 
The manner in which social media is currently functioning 
within the parameters of copyright law is precarious, and it may 
only be a matter of time before it collapses into lawsuits, similar to 
the file-sharing suits of the early 2000s.117 Once again, technology 
has outpaced development of the law, and the best way to address 
                                                
116 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital 
Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002) (“Chasing individual 
consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem . . 
.”). 
117 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing the file sharing 
lawsuits); Manesh, supra note 10, at 20–32 (discussing the stages of litigation 
that record companies and other copyright owners of sound recordings brought 
against different types of peer-to-peer file sharing software companies, and the 
waves of lawsuits brought against individual users); see also Sarah McBride & 
Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html (discussing the 
recording industry’s plan to end litigation after suing tens of thousands of 
individuals for illegally downloading music). 
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the copyright implications of social media is through the legislative 
process. 
 
